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This chapter explores the legal challenges to Chinese financial institutions in Southeast Asia against the 
backdrop of China’s grand ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) and the establishment of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community. Banking and finance play important roles in 
promoting trade, investment and infrastructure projects. The development of ASEAN, an immense 
economic bloc located immediately south of China, will have an enormous effect on the BRI strategy. 
This chapter outlines the current development of financial integration within ASEAN with respect to the 
bloc’s banking and insurance sectors. It also considers the legal obstacles and potential trade barriers 
facing Chinese banks and insurers offering credit facilities or insurance protection to projects 
implemented in ASEAN amidst further ASEAN financial integration and the ASEAN-China free trade 
agreement (FTA). 
China announced its BRI plan in 2013 as an initiative to improve economic cooperation along the 
traditional Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (together, the New Silk 
Road). Given its geographic proximity, it is clear that Southeast Asia will play an important role in BRI 
projects. On the inland Silk Road, several Southeast Asian countries (e.g. Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar) 
are adjacent to the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, thus offering alternative land routes from China to 
the Indian Ocean. The maritime Silk Road, which passes through the South China Sea, will also traverse 
a number of Southeast Asian countries before entering the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The BRI will 
clearly bring new opportunities to emerging Southeast Asian economies. The member countries of 
ASEAN1 have been slowly moving towards greater regional and economic integration, with intra-
ASEAN trade almost quadrupling since 2000 to reach US$630 billion in 2013.2 ASEAN also established 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Such integration within ASEAN will inevitably 
affect the execution of the BRI. 
In this chapter, the juncture of BRI and intra-ASEAN economic and financial integration is approached 
from the perspective of cross-border financial services. The chapter explores the existing commitments 
of ASEAN countries in terms of financial services and their ongoing financial integration. It also 
considers the position of the Chinese banks and insurers seeking to provide lending or insurance services 
to Chinese and/or local firms working on infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. According to the 
                                                          
1 The ten ASEAN member states are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (the five original founding 
states), Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
2 Almekinders et al., ‘ASEAN financial integration’ (2015), IMF working paper WP/15/34, 5, accessed 8 June 2018, 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1534.pdf. 
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Financial Times, the New Silk Road is likely to require US$890 billion in investment.3 The newly 
established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as the Export-Import Bank of China and 
China Development Bank, may provide some of the funding required.4 However, Chinese commercial 
banks are also expected to participate in some projects. It has been reported, for example, that the China 
Construction Bank (CCB) has agreed to partner with IE Singapore, a government body, to finance BRI 
projects ‘with about US$22 billion in funding envisaged’.5 Therefore, market access to Southeast Asia is 
likely to become a legal issue for Chinese banks looking to finance projects in ASEAN nations. 
Insurance companies will also play a role, offering essential services to Chinese and/or local firms 
engaging in BRI projects. Chinese investments and project output require protection from natural 
disasters such as tsunamis or earthquakes and from human hazards such as riots. It is also necessary to 
ensure the life and health of Chinese employees in Southeast Asia. Having proper protection may well 
encourage more investment by Chinese and local investors alike in the building of the New Silk Road. 
Although ASEAN integration is still underway and may take many years to progress further, this chapter 
explores some of the issues facing Chinese banks and insurers offering financial services in ASEAN to 
sponsor infrastructure projects or facilitate the trading and provision of other services. At the macro 
level, the successful implementation of BRI projects might give China a stronger voice in international 
governance issues, and the expansion of Chinese businesses abroad might in return help Chinese firms 
to improve their business practices both in and outside China. Whilst BRI’s actual impact remains to be 
seen, this chapter argues that China’s BRI-related ventures may in the long run help to raise rule-of-law 
standards in China itself. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the current stage of ASEAN 
integration with respect to financial services. Section 2 analyses the challenges that Chinese financial 
institutions face in entering the ASEAN market to offer lending and general insurance services, 
particularly in terms of cross-border supply and market access. The section also considers the BRI’s 
potential long-term impact on China’s standing with respect to international governance and the rule of 
law. Section 3 concludes the chapter. 
 
1 ASEAN Financial Integration  
1.1 Background: ASEAN and the AEC  
ASEAN was established as an international organisation comprising Southeast Asian countries on 8 
August 1967 with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok6 ten years after the establishment 
of the European Economic Community (EEC). Since its establishment, ASEAN has become a platform 
for promoting ‘cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and 
in the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law 
                                                          
3 James Kynge, ‘How the Silk Road plans will be financed’, Financial Times, 10 May 2016, accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.ft.com/content/e83ced94-0bd8-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 ASEAN, ‘About ASEAN’, ASEAN website, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/. 
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and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’.7 However, unlike the European Union 
(EU) and its predecessor, the EEC, ASEAN has yet to create centralised institutions and a top-down 
regime to regulate the ASEAN market or harmonise regulations across the region. Instead, we have the 
‘ASEAN Way’, a commitment not to use ‘collective defense to serve the interests of any among the big 
powers’ and a promise to resort to ‘the principle of consultation … as the basis for settling differences 
among members’.8 ASEAN’s guiding principles are inclusiveness, transparency and reciprocity,9 and 
the ASEAN Way is premised on the principle of consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
member states, an approach that is applied to regional matters ranging from conflict management to 
economic development.10 
The adoption of the ASEAN Way needs to be understood in light of the geopolitical and economic 
background of Southeast Asia, a region that varies widely in terms of economic development, cultures 
and political systems. For example, in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) terms, Singapore was 
the richest country in ASEAN in 2014, with GDP of US$56,284.30. Cambodia, in contrast, had per 
capita GDP of just US$1,094.60 that year, and the figure for Myanmar was US$1,203.80.11 However, 
Singapore is also ASEAN’s smallest country, and is surrounded by two large, predominantly Muslim 
countries (i.e. Malaysia and Indonesia). Hence, ASEAN faces challenges to regional integration that 
Europe has not seen in the past two decades. 
Although Southeast Asia was in turmoil for several decades, partly owing to the Vietnam War and Cold 
War, the region has in general flourished in the past two decades. According to ASEAN figures, per 
capita GDP in ASEAN as a whole jumped from US$1.33 trillion in 2007 to US$2.57 trillion in 2014 (a 
93 per cent increase), becoming the third largest economy in Asia (behind only China and India) and the 
seventh largest in the world.12 With a population of 622 million,13 its consumer base is bettered only by 
China and India.14 ASEAN countries have agreed to open up cross-border trade and services based on 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework and, as noted, officially implemented the AEC in 
December 2015, marking a new era of economic integration. Initiatives to boost economic integration 
began to take shape after the first circulation of the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN 
Economic Cooperation in 1992.15 Several key agreements have been signed and implemented in the 
years since, including the ASEAN FTA in 1992 (superseded by the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement 
in 2010), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) in 1995 and the Framework 
                                                          
7 ASEAN, ‘History: the founding of ASEAN’, ASEAN website, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.asean.org/asean/about-
asean/history. 
8 G. Goh, ‘The “ASEAN way”: non-intervention and ASEAN’s role in conflict management’ (2003) 3(1) Stanford Journal of 
East Asian Affairs 114. 
9 Alice Huang, ‘The ABCs of ASEAN’s economic and banking integration’, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Pacific 
Exchange Blog, 16 November 2015, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.frbsf.org/banking/asia-program/pacific-exchange-
blog/abcs-of-aseans-economic-and-banking-integration/. 
10 Elizabeth S. K. Ng, ‘ASEAN IP harmonization: striking the delicate balance’ (2013) 25 Pace International Law Review 
129–58 at 134. 
11 Data extracted from the World Bank website, accessed 8 June 2018, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
12 ASEAN, A Blueprint for Growth – ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Progress and Key Achievements (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), p. 1, accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.miti.gov.my/miti/resources/AEC_2015_Progress_and_Key_Achievement.pdf?mid=424. 
13 Ibid., pp. 1–2. 
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
15 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area in 2012.16 The AEC’s formation was first proposed in a 2003 
summit before its official formation in 2015. The four pillars of the AEC and regional integration are 
‘(a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of 
equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy’.17 
Economic development benefits not only the trading of physical goods but also cross-border services. 
Services accounted for between 35 per cent (in Myanmar) and more than 70 per cent (in Singapore) of 
overall ASEAN GDP in 2013.18 The import and export of services within ASEAN have also increased 
since 2005.19 However, the ‘diverse development stages across the region have been a primary obstacle 
to the AEC’s objective to promote a “free flow of services”’.20 According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the total national GDP of ASEAN countries in 2013 ranged from as high as US$870 billion 
(Indonesia) to barely US$11 billion (Laos). As it did in 2014, Singapore also had the highest per capita 
GDP in 2013, US$55,182, whilst Indonesia recorded just US$3,510 and Laos US$1,594.21 It has also 
been noted that ‘[m]ost ASEAN countries are still at a relative[ly] early stage of development and have 
large infrastructure gap[s]’.22 Different service sectors also face different challenges.23 Nonetheless, 
economic development has in general paved the way for further financial integration within ASEAN. 
1.2 ASEAN Financial Service Integration  
Financial services constitute an important part of the AEC’s plans, and the export of such services by 
ASEAN countries has increased significantly over time.24 ASEAN recognises that an integrated regional 
financial system is ‘a key catalyst for financial sector development, which, in turn, improves efficiencies 
and lowers the cost of capital’.25 Further financial integration could achieve ‘a well-functioning regional 
financial system with more liberalised financial services, capital account regimes and inter-linked capital 
markets, to facilitate greater trade and investment in the region’.26 Accordingly, ensuring a stable and 
inclusive financial sector is a key goal for regional economic integration, and ASEAN has set three 
strategic objectives for achievement by 2025: financial integration, financial inclusion and financial 
stability.27 Specific strategic measures include liberalising the financial service sector under the ASEAN 
Trade in Services Agreement to offer greater market access and operational flexibility for ASEAN 
banks, promote deeper insurance penetration, and deepen the interlinking of capital markets by 
progressing towards greater connectivity in clearing and settlement and custody services and the 
development of the bond market.28 Key financial inclusion measures will enhance the financial 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 5. 
18 ASEAN, ASEAN Integration in Services (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), p. 7 (see Chart 1), accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/ASEAN-Integration-in-Services-(Dec 2015).pdf. 
19 Ibid., Chart 2. 
20 Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘Liberalizing trade in legal services under Asia-Pacific FTAs: the ASEAN case’ (2015) 18 Journal of 
Economic Law 153–85 at 155. 
21 Almekinders et al., ‘ASEAN financial integration’, 6. 
22 Ibid., 12. 
23 See, e.g. Hsieh, ‘Liberalizing trade in legal services’, for a general discussion of the legal service sector within ASEAN. 
24 ASEAN, ASEAN Integration in Services, p. 8 (Chart 4). 
25 ASEAN, A Blueprint for Growth, p. 14. 
26 Ibid. 
27 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), p. 16, accessed 8 June 2018 
at www.asean.org/storage/2016/03/AECBP_2025r_FINAL.pdf. 
28 Ibid., p. 17. 
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ecosystem through collaboration, widen the scope of financial access and literacy and expand the 
distribution channels for financial products (e.g. micro-insurance).29 All of these measures require strong 
financial stability within the region, which means that ASEAN must intensify the process of 
macroeconomic and financial surveillance and the implementation of cross-border cooperative 
arrangements for financial supervision.30  
With respect to the banking industry, ASEAN members approved the ASEAN Banking Integration 
Framework (ABIF) in 2014. There has also been some collaboration amongst ASEAN states with the 
goal of forming ASEAN Exchanges to boost capital markets. The ASEAN Trading Link was launched 
in 2012 to provide investors with easier access to the stock markets of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
to facilitate the trading of shares and to deepen the stock market pool.31 In the insurance sector, ASEAN 
countries have agreed on the ASEAN Insurance Integration Framework (AIIF), which will – in principle 
– liberalise the cross-border supply of marine, aviation and goods in international transit (MAT) 
insurance32 as part of the seventh package of financial sector commitments under AFAS, which was 
ratified in 23 June 2016.33  
ABIF is structured under AFAS,34 which, as noted, was signed on 15 December 1995.35 According to 
the AFAS Annex on Financial Services,36 each country is entitled to take prudential measures for the 
protection of investors, deposit holders and policy holders.37 Member states are also allowed to 
implement exchange controls to ensure the stability of their exchange rates,38 and may recognise the 
prudential measures of another state.39 Thus, each member state is entitled to regulate its own financial 
institutions, whilst ABIF offers a foundation for mutual recognition. ABIF was endorsed by ASEAN 
Central Bank Governors in December 201440 to provide a further step towards a more European-style 
‘single passport’ concept for cross-border banking services within the ASEAN region.41 The framework 
was officially enabled by the Protocol to Implement the Sixth Package of Commitment on Financial 
Services under AFAS, which was signed in March 2015 by ASEAN Finance Ministers. 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ASEAN, A Blueprint for Growth, pp. 14–15. 
32 ASEAN, Building the ASEAN Community – Insurance Sector Integration: Supporting Growth through Better Risk 
Management (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), accessed June 2018 at 
www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/October/outreach-document/Edited Insurance Sector Integration-1.pdf. 
33 ‘ASEAN financial integration: where are we, where next?’, Keynote address by Ravi Menon, Managing Director, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, at ASEAN Banking Council Meeting on 12 June 2015, Monetary Authority of Singapore, 
accessed 8 June 2018 at www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-policy-
statements/speeches/2015/asean-financial-integration-where-are-we-where-next.aspx. 
34 ASEAN, Building the ASEAN Community – ASEAN Banking Integration: Strong Regional Banks, More Robust and 
Inclusive Growth (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/October/outreach-document/Edited ASEAN Banking Integration Framework-1.pdf. 
35 See ‘ASEAN financial integration: where are we, where next?’. 
36 See ASEAN website www.asean.org (accessed 8 June 2018) 
37 Paragraph 2(a) of AFAS Annex on Financial Services. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., para. 3(a). 
40 ASEAN, Building the ASEAN Community – ASEAN Banking Integration. 
41 Eli Remolona and Ilhyock Shim, ‘The rise of regional banking in Asia and the Pacific’ (2015) September BIS Quarterly 
Review 128. 
 6 
 
 
There are two layers to ABIF. The first is a multilateral layer that creates ASEAN-wide guidelines for 
financial service integration. The second is a bilateral layer allowing two countries to conduct bilateral 
talks on greater access to qualified ASEAN banks (QABs) in each other’s markets.42 On this basis, 
ABIF grants banks that meet certain criteria (i.e. QABs) greater access and more flexibility to operate 
within the ASEAN market.43 ABIF’s purpose is to spur trade and investment within ASEAN and afford 
better access to finance for small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the unbanked.44 Further 
financial integration may also boost growth, employment and financial inclusion and facilitate larger and 
deeper liquid financial markets, thereby lowering capital costs and improving resource allocation and 
risk diversification.45  
Although the full details of the AIIF are not yet clear, it is evident that the framework will initially focus 
on transport- and shipping-related insurance (i.e. MAT insurance). The policy objective is obvious, as 
the MAT insurance sector is related to cross-border trade. Whether the AIIF will eventually cover other 
forms of general insurance or even life insurance remains to be seen. 
Whilst the idea of financial service integration is sound, and the developments in that direction to date 
are encouraging, there are a number of challenges in opening up cross-border banking services within 
ASEAN. Such opening-up must be balanced against the risks of financial instability and financial 
contagion,46 and more stringent supervision may be necessary. At the same time, the financial markets 
of ASEAN countries are in different stages of development. For example, the cost-to-income ratio of 
Indonesian banks is much higher than that of other banks in the region.47 The IMF has recommended 
that ASEAN countries at different stages of development implement different integration timelines.48 It 
is hoped that the less developed countries in the region will ultimately catch up with their more 
advanced counterparts. 
In contrast to the EU approach, ABIF was not imposed by a supranational body, and is not mandatory. 
ASEAN has adopted a two-track approach to phase out restrictions on wholesale banking while delaying 
the completion of retail banking liberalisation until a later stage.49 ABIF is also built upon a three-
dimensional framework under which equal access, equal treatment and an equal environment are the 
three long-term guiding principles.50 Accordingly, ABIF offers only a framework by which two or more 
member states can negotiate the liberalisation of their banking sectors.51 For example, the Bank of 
Indonesia, Financial Services Authority of Indonesia and Central Bank of Malaysia signed a bilateral 
agreement under the auspices of ABIF in 2014.52 ASEAN countries must agree on a set of standards for 
QABs, and then these bilateral commitments are placed under each country’s Consolidated Schedule of 
Specific Commitments on Financial Services (under the WTO structure).53 Thus, the legal effect is not 
                                                          
42 Yasmine Yahya, ‘Banking on ASEAN banks to step up with AEC’, The Straits Times, 9 December 2015, accessed 8 June 
2018 at www.straitstimes.com/opinion/banking-on-asean-banks-to-step-up-with-aec. 
43 ASEAN, Building the ASEAN Community – ASEAN Banking Integration. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Almekinders et al., ‘ASEAN financial integration’, 13. 
46 ASEAN, Building the ASEAN Community – ASEAN Banking Integration. 
47 Huang, ‘The ABCs of ASEAN’s’. 
48 Almekinders et al., ‘ASEAN financial integration’, 15. 
49 Ibid., 15. 
50 Ibid. 
51 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, p. 5. 
52 Remolona and Shim, ‘The rise of regional banking in Asia’, 128. 
53 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, p. 5. 
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very strong. As the IMF notes, the ASEAN Way means that ‘individual ASEAN member countries can 
take steps toward further financial sector liberalization and capital account liberalization if and when 
they believe [themselves] to be ready’.54 Nonetheless, this is a first step towards a more integrated 
financial market. 
 
2 Belt and Road Initiative in the Context of ASEAN Financial Integration  
What might the establishment of the AEC and ASEAN financial integration mean for the BRI? Even 
with the establishment of the AEC and ABIF, considerable trade barriers remain, both amongst ASEAN 
states and between ASEAN states and third-party countries. The focus in this section is on issues 
relating to the core financial services most closely connected with infrastructure projects in Southeast 
Asia. In particular, it focuses on the cross-border supply of credit facilities (e.g. syndicated loans led by 
Chinese banks) and on general insurance on properties or economic interests held by Chinese entities 
doing business in Southeast Asia, as well as the commercial presence of Chinese banks in the ASEAN 
region. These issues are examined from three perspectives. First, the section analyses the trade barriers 
faced by Chinese banks or insurers that enter Southeast Asia in the context of the FTA between China 
and ASEAN. Second, it analyses issues within ASEAN arising from the presence of Chinese financial 
firms in one or more ASEAN countries. Such analysis further allows examination of the potential 
opportunities presented by ASEAN financial integration to Chinese or other non-ASEAN financial 
institutions. Finally, the continued rise of the internet and combination of financial services and 
information technology have given rise to the ‘fintech’ phenomenon, which offers a further dimension 
of cross-border provision and financial service consumption that may challenge any existing regulatory 
frameworks and trade agreements. 
 
2.1 Cross-Border Financial Services between China and ASEAN  
At the international trade level, the extent to which Chinese financial institutions can offer financial 
services to Southeast Asia is defined by the FTA signed between China and ASEAN in November 2002 
in the form of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between ASEAN 
and the People’s Republic of China (China-ASEAN FTA hereafter).55 The Agreement on Trade in 
Goods went into effect in July 2005, whilst the Agreement on Trade in Services was signed in January 
2007 (effective July 2007).56 This latter agreement lays out the framework for the cross-border supply 
and consumption of financial services between China and ASEAN. Pursuant to the China-ASEAN 
Agreement on Trade in Services, the GATS Annex on Financial Services is applicable,57 meaning that 
China and ASEAN countries can for prudential reasons take measures to protect investors, deposit 
                                                          
54 Almekinders et al., ‘ASEAN financial integration’, 12. 
55 For the general background of the ASEAN-China FTA and free trade area, see Alyssa Greenwald, ‘The ASEAN-China 
free trade area (ACFTA): a legal response to China’s economic rise’ (2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 193–216. 
56 ‘China FTA network’, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 8 June 2018 at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml. 
57 Article 28(1) of China-ASEAN Agreement on Trade in Services. 
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holders and policy holders to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.58 A country may 
also recognise the ‘prudential measures of any other country in determining how the Member’s 
measures relating to financial services shall be applied’ through harmonisation or an agreement.59 
Accordingly, each country is generally allowed to impose prudential regulations on financial institutions 
even if those regulations amount to trade barriers. The specific commitments made by each ASEAN 
country under the China-ASEAN FTA are reported in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 covers the two main forms of financial service supply by way of the cross-border supply (i.e. 
Mode 1, see Table 7.3) of lending services by banks and the commercial presence (i.e. Mode 3, see 
Table 7.3) of foreign banks under the international trade framework. It is clear from the table that 
financial services between China and ASEAN are not fully open and that the degree of openness varies 
by country. In some ASEAN countries (e.g. Indonesia and the Philippines), financial services are not 
even on the agenda, whereas in others they are open to Chinese financial institutions as long as several 
conditions are fulfilled. As discussed further below, these conditions commonly include foreign 
ownership caps. Many countries choose to remain unbound for certain services to ensure that they 
remain free to apply local regulations to regulate foreign market participants. However, this environment 
has not deterred Chinese financial institutions from operating in Southeast Asia, as illustrated by Table 
7.2, which shows the commercial presence of the five largest Chinese commercial banks in the region in 
2015. 
  
                                                          
58 Article 2(a) of GATS Annex on Financial Services. 
59 Ibid., Article 3(a). 
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Table 7.1 Limitations on Market Access under China-ASEAN FTA for Select Sectors  
Country/Activity Commercial Banking Insurance 
Brunei Not listed in Specific Commitments. Not listed in Specific Commitments. 
Cambodia 1. Deposit-taking, lending and payment services: 
1. No limitation except that deposits received from the 
public must be reinvested in Cambodia. 
2. No limitation on commercial presence except through 
authorised financial institutions such as banks. 
1. For life business: 
a. Cross-border supply is subject to local licensing requirements. 
b. No limitation on commercial presence. 
2. For non-life business: 
a. No limitation on cross-border supply for marine, aviation and 
transport insurance from 1 January 2009. 
b. Otherwise, cross-border supply of non-life insurance service is 
subject to local licensing requirements. 
c. No limitation on commercial presence. 
3. Reinsurance 
a. No limitation on cross-border supply or commercial presence. 
Indonesia Not listed in Specific Commitments. Not listed in Specific Commitments. 
Laos 1. Not listed in Specific Commitments regarding deposit-
taking or lending services. 
1. Unbound regarding cross-border supply of insurance services (of 
any kind). 
2. No limitation on commercial presence, although insurers must be 
in company form provided by Laos law. 
Malaysia 1. Not listed in Specific Commitments regarding deposit-
taking or lending services. 
1. Director insurance: 
a. a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. b. For commercial presence, foreign ownership cannot exceed 
51%; new entry is limited to participation in a locally incorporated 
insurer; regulatory approval requires acquiring 5% or more of 
equity in a local insurer. 
Myanmar Not listed in Specific Commitments. Not listed in Specific Commitments. 
The Philippines Not listed in Specific Commitments. Not listed in Specific Commitments. 
Singapore 1. Deposit-taking: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. Commercial presence: deposit-taking is subject to local 
licensing requirements. 
c. No new full and wholesale commercial banks. 
2. 2. Lending activities: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. Commercial presence: subject to limitations on national 
treatment. 
c. Issuing credit cards is subject to local licensing 
requirements. 
d. Foreign banks offering Singapore dollar credit facilities 
exceeding S$5 million must ensure the money is 
converted into a foreign currency. 
1. Life business: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. No limitation on commercial presence except that a foreign party 
can only acquire up to 49% of a locally owned insurer. 
2. Non-life business: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. No limitation on commercial presence except that a foreign party 
can only acquire up to 49% of a locally owned insurer. 
3. Reinsurance: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. Unbound except for admission of direct insurance and reinsurance 
brokers as locally incorporated subsidiaries. 
Thailand Not listed in Specific Commitments. Not listed in Specific Commitments. 
Vietnam 1. Regarding deposit-taking and lending: 
a. Unbound for cross-border supply. 
b. No limitation on commercial presence except that 
foreign banks can only establish branches, 
representative offices or joint-controlled banks (with 
equity no more than 50%). 
1. No limitation on cross-border supply for (1) insurance services to 
foreigners working in Vietnam for foreign enterprises; (2) 
reinsurance services; and (3) insurance for international transport 
and goods in transit. 
2. No limitation on commercial presence except no fully owned 
foreign insurer on mandatory insurance (such as motor insurance 
or workmen’s compensation). 
Source: website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 5 June 2018, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml. 
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Table 7.2 Commercial Presence of Selected Chinese Banks in Southeast Asia  
Country/Activity Subsidiary Branch 
Representative 
Office 
Brunei    
Cambodia  ICBC (Phnom Penh)  
Indonesia  BOC (Jakarta)  
Laos  ICBC (Vientiane)  
Malaysia BOC   
Myanmar    
The Philippines  BOC (Manila)  
Singapore  BOC, ICBC, CCB, ABC, BComm  
Thailand BOC   
Vietnam 
 
BOC, CCB and BComm (in Ho Chi Minh City); ICBC 
(Hanoi) 
ABC (Hanoi) 
 
List of Abbreviations:  
ABC  Agricultural Bank of China. 
BOC  Bank of China 
BComm Bank of Communication 
CCB  China Construction Bank 
ICBC  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
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Table 7.3 Specific Commitments Regarding Banking Services for Select ASEAN States  
Country/Activity Mode 1a Mode 3b 
Brunei Unbound Subject to local licensing requirements. 
Cambodia None; deposits from the public 
must be reinvested in Cambodia. 
None except through authorised financial institutions such as banks. 
Indonesia None 1. Bound only two sub-branches and two auxiliary offices for a foreign bank’s branch office or 
a joint venture bank. 
2. A foreign bank is allowed to establish or acquire a locally incorporated bank in cooperation 
with Indonesian nationals/entities. 
3. Branch offices of a foreign bank may only open in some cities. 
4. Foreign ownership capped at 51% if shares are listed for trading. 
Laos None Subject to local regulations under the Commercial Banks Law. 
Malaysia Lending to residents in any 
currency in excess of RM 25 million 
must be undertaken jointly with a 
local bank. 
1. Entry is subject to local incorporation of a joint venture with foreign ownership capped at 
30%. 
2. A representative office is allowed only for research and liaison services. 
3. The provision of factoring services requires a separate entity with foreign ownership 
capped at 30%. 
4. Investment banks cannot provide consumer credit or home mortgages. 
5. Only commercial banks are allowed to provide overdraft services. 
6. Offshore banks are permitted to lend in foreign currencies only. 
Myanmar Unbound for representative office 
services by a foreign bank. 
Foreign banks are allowed to open representative offices in Myanmar. 
The Philippines Commercial presence required. 1. A widely held and listed foreign bank can take one form of commercial presence at a time 
but can still invest in up to 40% of voting stock of a local bank. 
2. Maximum six branches, with three by choice and three designated by the board. 
3. Acquisition of up to 60% of voting stock of an existing domestic bank or a newly 
incorporated local bank. 
4. Ownership by a non-bank financial service provider capped at 40% 
Singapore Unbound 1. Credit card can only be issued if approved by MAS [the central bank]. 
2. Finance companies cannot extend S$ credit to non-resident financial entities. 
Thailand 1. None for financial advisory 
and data processing. 
2. Unbound for all other 
services. 
1. None for representative office. 
2. Foreign bank branch: 
a. None for existing foreign bank branches under the present shareholding structure. 
b. New establishment subject to licensing requirements. 
c. ATM operations permitted if joining ATM pool with other Thai banks or on own premises or 
sharing facilities with commercial banks in Thailand. 
d. None for participation in cheque-clearing system. 
3. Locally incorporated bank: 
a. Market access limited to acquisition of shares of existing banks. 
b. Shareholding by Thai nationals no less than 75% except by approval of the Bank of 
Thailand (but still up to only 49%). 
c. Thai government may take the necessary measures to support the financial system. 
d. At least three-quarters of directors must be Thai nationals. 
Vietnam Unbound except for the provision 
of financial information and 
advisory services. 
None, except: 
1. Foreign bank’s commercial presence: 
a. Foreign commercial bank: in the form of rep office or branch, joint venture bank with 
foreign capital not more than 50%, etc. 
b. Foreign financial leasing company: rep office, branch, foreign joint venture leasing 
company or 100% foreign invested financial leasing company. 
2. Vietnam may limit equity participation by a foreign credit institution. 
3. A rep office is not allowed to open transaction points outside its branch office. 
a Cross-border supply60 
b Commercial presence 
                                                          
60 See WTO, ‘GATS training module: chapter 1 – basic purpose and concepts’, accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s3p1_e.htm#boxa. 
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Source: Protocol to Implement the Sixth Package of Commitment on Financial Services under the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services, accessed 5 June 2018, http://asean.org/storage/2016/12/Consolidated-AFAS-6-SOCs-with-ABIF-
Commitments.pdf. 
As Table 7.2 shows, the five largest banks in China all have branches in Singapore, reflecting the city-
state’s status as the financial centre of the region. Vietnam is another popular country, with four of the 
banks having a branch in either Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi and the ABC having a representative office 
in Hanoi. However, the degree of the banks’ commercial presence in other countries varies. Only the 
BOC has subsidiary banks in Malaysia and Thailand, as well as branches in four other ASEAN states. 
The ICBC has shown some interest in Cambodia and Laos, but its commercial presence in other 
ASEAN countries is more limited. With Myanmar opening up and ASEAN still enjoying good 
economic growth, there is certainly room for Chinese banks to expand their presence in Southeast Asia. 
However, Singapore is expected to be the most likely main entry point for Chinese financial institutions 
going forward. 
In contrast to the banking sector, it is harder to paint an accurate picture of the Chinese presence in the 
Southeast Asian insurance market, as it is not always clear from the annual reports of insurers, although 
the situation varies for direct insurance and reinsurance. With respect to the former, some Chinese 
insurers have a presence in the retail markets of some ASEAN countries, selling direct insurance 
products to local customers. For example, China Insurance and China Taiping both have a wholly 
owned subsidiary in Singapore61 selling life and general insurance products to Singaporean customers. 
With respect to the latter, many reinsurers also have offices in Singapore, the largest reinsurance hub in 
Southeast Asia, to acquire insurance risk exposure. Chinese insurers may come to Singapore to seek 
reinsurance or to provide it to other direct insurers. 
The next section explores whether Chinese banks can enter the ASEAN market through their 
commercial presence in ASEAN countries. 
2.2 Financial Services within ASEAN  
2.2.1 ABIF and Specific Commitments Regarding Core Banking Services within ASEAN  
Even with the establishment of ABIF and the AEC, ASEAN countries still impose considerable trade 
barriers on the cross-border supply and commercial presence of non-local financial institutions through 
the Protocol to Implement the Sixth Package of Commitment on Financial Services signed on 20 March 
2015. This protocol is largely based on the commitments made by each ASEAN state within the WTO 
structure. Some of the key features of the cross-border supply (i.e. Mode 1) of lending services by banks 
and the commercial presence (i.e. Mode 3) of foreign banks in ASEAN states are summarised in Table 
7.3. 
It is worth noting that most of the ASEAN countries in Table 7.3 are committed to being unbound only 
with respect Mode 1, the only exceptions being Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. Even Singapore, the de 
facto financial centre of the region, has declared itself unbound. The implication is that these countries 
want to ‘remain free in the sector and the mode of supply to introduce or maintain measures that are 
                                                          
61 China Life Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd and China Taiping Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd, respectively. 
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inconsistent with market access or national treatment’.62 In addition, some countries such as Indonesia 
have restricted the commercial presence (e.g. the number of branches or offices) of foreign banks. Under 
the present circumstances, if a Chinese bank plans to provide loans directly to borrowers (whether those 
borrowers be foreign firms, local firms or joint venture entities) in most ASEAN countries without going 
through branches or offices in those countries, it will be subject to local regulations. Commercial 
presence is even more heavily regulated. It is clear from Table 7.3 that there are a variety of markets 
access thresholds. More neutral requirements, such as in Brunei, are being subject to local licensing 
requirements in setting up a subsidiary, branch or representative office. In Europe, the single passport 
concept and harmonisation of licensing standards for banks may well help to eliminate between-country 
differences within the region. 
In ASEAN, as noted earlier, the aim of ABIF is to advance regional banking integration. A QAB may be 
recognised without satisfying any additional local requirements. As the ABIF structure allows bilateral 
agreements between countries, we could in theory see as many as forty-five agreements of this kind 
signed within ASEAN in the future. Indonesia and Malaysia signed a ‘Heads of Agreement’ document 
in January 2015,63 and more agreements have followed. Thailand signed letters of intent with Malaysia 
and Indonesia in March 2016 regarding the QAB framework,64 and Bankko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) 
in the Philippines and Bank Negara Malaysia signed entry agreements in early March of 2016.65 In 
addition, Indonesia is reportedly in talks with Myanmar about a banking deal.66 Malaysia and Indonesia 
seem to be the most active players at present. Interestingly, Singapore had not struck a deal with any 
other country as of June 2017. 
However, as these agreements have not yet reached any public forum, the exact QAB criteria remain 
unclear. We can collect only gather indirect evidence from press releases. Pursuant to the media 
announcement made by BSP: 
A key provision … [is] that it [the entry agreement] allows up to three QABs from each jurisdiction to 
operate in the other country. These QABs will enter the host jurisdiction only in the form of a subsidiary 
of the parent bank in the home jurisdiction in line with the principle of reciprocity. As these QABs from 
Malaysia enter the Philippines, they will then be regulated under applicable BSP regulations and within 
the legal framework defined under Republic Act No. 10641… QABs are strong and well-managed 
banks, headquartered in ASEAN and majority owned by ASEAN nationals. Banks that apply for QAB 
                                                          
62 See the WTO’s explanation in ‘Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments and the list of article II 
exemptions’, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm. 
63 See Charles Small, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia financial agreement a model for bilateralism’, ASEAN Briefing, 9 January 2015, 
accessed 8 June 2018 at www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/01/09/indonesia-malaysia-financial-agreement-model-
bilateralism.html. 
64 See ‘The signing of the letter of intent on bilateral arrangement regarding qualified ASEAN banks between Thailand and 
Indonesia’, Bank of Thailand press release issued on 31 March 2016, accessed 8 June 2018 at 
www.bot.or.th/Thai/PressandSpeeches/Press/News2559/n1659e.pdf#search=letter%2520of%2520intent. 
65 See ‘Philippines and Malaysia sign agreement on entry of banks under ABIF’, BSP media release issued on 14 March 
2016, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.bsp.gov.ph/printpage.asp?ref=www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp%3Fid%3D4016; 
Mayvelin U. Caraballo, ‘Malaysian bank seeks PH entry as QAB 2016’, The Manila Times, 16 March 2016, accessed 8 June 
at www.manilatimes.net/malaysian-bank-seeks-ph-entry-as-qab/250795/. 
66 Grace D. Amianti, ‘OJK expects to bag deal with Myanmar soon’, The Jakarta Post, 15 October 2015, accessed 8 June 
2018 at www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/15/ojk-expects-bag-deal-with-myanmar-soon.html. 
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status must be endorsed by the home country regulator to and may be accepted by the host country 
regulator based on their bilateral agreement.67  
There are several noteworthy points in this press release issued by the central bank of the Philippines. 
Pursuant to the Filipino-Malaysian agreement, only three banks from each country will be approved as 
QABs. It is suspected that there is likely a common standard for allowing three QABs from each 
country. Those QABs will still have to incorporate a local subsidiary to operate in the Philippines. Thus, 
the operation of a QAB in a host state (e.g. the Philippines) is still well within the control of the host 
regulator (e.g. the BSP). In addition, the Filipino-Malaysian agreement also provides that a QAB must 
be headquartered in an ASEAN country and majority-owned by ASEAN nationals. It must also be 
sanctioned by the home country regulator to qualify as a QAB. Thus, there is still a considerable entry 
threshold even following ABIF’s creation. In this sense, the idea of a single passport under ABIF is 
much more limited in scope than its counterpart in Europe. As ABIF remains in its infancy, we must 
wait for further developments. 
 
2.2 Specific Commitments Regarding Insurance Services within ASEAN  
Like the banking industry, the insurance sector is fraught with trade barriers, as shown in Table 7.4. 
The opening of the insurance sector has lagged behind that of the banking sector, although the AIIF had 
not been fully agreed upon as of June 201768 Thus, until it is finalised it is difficult to predict exactly 
what the framework will look like or whether it will be akin to ABIF (in limiting each country to three 
QABs on a bilateral basis, for example). However, the Southeast Asian insurance market is far more 
fragmented and complex than the region’s banking sector. Whilst there are several regional giants, 
including the Singapore-headquartered DBS Group and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) 
and Malaysia’s CIMB Group, there is currently no large cross-ASEAN insurance group. Even in 
Singapore, the market is divided amongst a few large local insurers (e.g. Great Eastern and NTUC 
Income) and several foreign ones (e.g. Prudential and Manulife), with none dominating the market. The 
region thus holds promising opportunities for Chinese insurers. 
Similar to the banking situation, most ASEAN countries have chosen to remain unbound with respect to 
the cross-border supply of insurance services to allow them to apply local regulations without making 
any commitments at the international trade level. However, a few, including Laos, do not restrict the 
cross-border supply of insurance products, and others have opened up their insurance markets on a more 
limited basis. Vietnam, for example, imposes no restrictions on the provision of insurance to foreign-
invested enterprises and foreign workers, and the situation in the Philippines is similar. Hence, Vietnam 
controls only insurance products sold to local Vietnamese, which should be understood in line with the 
country’s commitment to attracting foreign direct investment. In addition, some ASEAN countries such 
as Cambodia and Thailand have opened their markets to marine, aviation and transport (MAT) insurance 
to promote the export and trade sectors. 
                                                          
67 See ‘Philippines and Malaysia sign agreement on entry of banks under ABIF’. 
68 See Section 1.2 of this chapter. 
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Table 7.4 Specific Commitments Regarding the Insurance Sector  
Country/Activity Mode 1a Mode 3b 
Brunei Unbound 1. Subject to licensing requirements; locally incorporated company 
or branch required. 
2. Approval from AMBD required to acquire control of a locally 
incorporated insurer. 
Cambodia 1. None for marine, aviation and transport insurance, but 
before conditions are met, it has to be conducted with a 
licensed insurer in Cambodia. 
2. Only by entering into a contract with licensed insurer in 
Cambodia. 
None 
Indonesia Unbound Subject to Indonesia’s Horizontal Measures and General Conditions. 
Indonesia may impose foreign ownership restrictions. 
Laos None None 
Malaysia 1. Soliciting and advertising in Malaysia not allowed. 
2. Approval of Central Bank required for direct placement of 
insurance abroad of properties in Malaysia and liability of 
residents of third party. 
1. Permitted only through insurance companies and international 
Takaful operators. 
2. Offshore insurers in Labuan not allowed to underwrite direct 
insurance of Malaysian risk. 
Myanmar Unclear Unclear 
The Philippines Local risk shall be insured with companies authorised in the 
Philippines. 
Subject to: 
1. Acquisition of equity interest of a local insurer up to 100%. 
2. Investment of a new locally incorporated insurer up to 100%. 
3. Participation of foreigners on the board of insurers is proportional 
to the percentage of foreign equity. 
Singapore Unbound None except that foreign parties can only acquire equity stakes up to 
49% in a local insurer (and cannot be the largest shareholder). 
Thailand Unbound except for international marine, aviation and transit 
and all classes of reinsurance. 
1. Foreign ownership capped at 25%. 
2. New establishment subject to licensing requirements. 
Vietnam None for: 
1. Insurance provided to enterprises with foreign-invested 
capital and foreigners working in Vietnam. 
2. Reinsurance. 
3. Insurance for international transportation. 
4. Insurance brokering. 
5. Consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and claim 
settlement services. 
None except non-life branches of foreign insurance enterprises shall 
be permitted subject to prudential regulations. 
a Cross-border supply 
b Commercial presence 
 
Source: Protocol to Implement the Sixth Package of Commitment on Financial Services under the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services, accessed 8 June 2018 at http://asean.org/storage/2016/12/Consolidated-AFAS-6-SOCs-with-ABIF-
Commitments.pdf. 
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Direct access to the insurance markets of ASEAN countries remains subject to the domestic licensing 
requirements for local subsidiaries or branches. It is not uncommon for there to be a cap on the foreign 
ownership of a domestic insurer, which affects foreign firms’ ability to acquire an equity stake in them; 
for example, Thailand imposes a ceiling of 25 per cent. In contrast to the banking sector, the insurance 
sector boasts a number of insurance-related auxiliary services such as insurance brokerage, adjustment 
for marine losses, actuarial services and claim settlement services. These services are subject to local 
licensing requirements in the majority of ASEAN states that choose to remain unbound, although some, 
such as Vietnam, have committed to imposing no requirements on their cross-border supply. 
 
2.3 Challenges to Chinese Financial Institutions  
The China-ASEAN FTA and current state of ASEAN financial integration under ABIF and the pending 
AIIF create a number of challenges for Chinese banks seeking to advance further into Southeast Asia in 
support of BRI projects launched by Chinese or non-Chinese firms. For example, assuming that the 
definition of a QAB refers to a bank incorporated in ASEAN and owned by ASEAN nationals, Chinese 
banks will not be able to acquire QAB status in the short term unless ASEAN further opens up the 
banking sector, which means that they will have to establish a stronger commercial presence in the 
ASEAN countries that permit them to provide financial services to Chinese firms or the local citizenry. 
It is worth noting, however, that there are other – invisible – trade barriers that may deter foreign 
players. For example, a regulator may delay approval for particular activities in order to disadvantage 
particular market participants. Because many activities require regulatory approval (e.g. the appointment 
of directors, an increase in capital), regulators have many ways to affect foreign financial institutions 
operating in the domestic market. Although it may not be reflected in trade agreements or financial 
regulations, such regulatory leeway can create another set of trade barriers for foreign banks. 
In addition, even if local licensing requirements do not present a major obstacle, there are potential 
foreign exchange controls in ASEAN, with every ASEAN country other than Singapore and Brunei 
having some form of such controls in place.69 For example, the Philippines requires that all foreign 
borrowing should acquire prior approval from BSP,70 and Malaysia still maintains foreign exchange 
controls under the Exchange Control Act of 1953.71 These restrictions present challenges to cross-border 
cash flows, indirectly affecting foreign investment and the provision of cross-border financial services. 
Further, all clearing in Renminbi (RMB) in the region must go through Singapore (or Hong Kong). 
ICBC’s Singapore branch has been the designated clearing bank for RMB in the city-state since 8 
February 2013.72 For this purpose, China’s five largest banks all have a commercial presence in 
Singapore. BOC and ICBC have already acquired full banking licences in Singapore, meaning that they 
can carry out retail activities in both Singapore dollars and foreign currencies. CCB, ABC and BComm, 
in contrast, have wholesale licences, allowing them to provide financial services to financial institutions 
but not to retail customers. Nonetheless, as the three large banking groups in Singapore, namely, DBS, 
OCBC and United Overseas Bank (UOB), are the likeliest candidates for QAB status in Singapore, the 
                                                          
69 See ‘Financial regulations’, ASEAN website, accessed 8 June 201 at www.asean.org/?static_post=financial-regulations/. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See ‘Regional gateway for RMB’, Monetary Authority of Singapore, accessed 8 June 2018 at www.mas.gov.sg/singapore-
financial-centre/overview/regional-gateway-for-rmb.aspx. 
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chances of Chinese banks becoming QABs appear slim until future developments open up more 
opportunities for financial integration within ASEAN. 
What are the implications for Chinese insurers who would like to sell insurance protection to firms 
working in Southeast Asia on a BRI project? Similar to the banking industry, the insurance sector also 
faces market access and licensing issues. However, insurance firms differ from institutions offering 
lending or deposit-taking services in several important ways. 
First, a Chinese insurer may be able to circumvent trade barriers in Southeast Asia by structuring an 
insurance policy as a domestic policy in China. In that case, it is a Chinese insurer located in China 
insuring against a foreign risk (i.e. the insured’s exposure in ASEAN) though a policy issued in Chinese 
territory. A similar situation would apply to a policy issued by a Chinese insurer in China to insure the 
life and health of a Chinese person working overseas. Although such activities do not technically 
constitute the cross-border supply of insurance products, thus permitting Chinese insurers to circumvent 
the issues arising from international trade or the cross-border supply of insurance services, there may be 
legal issues in China. For example, it is unclear whether China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) regulations allow Chinese insurers to insure against overseas risks. In addition, the strategy 
might not work if an infrastructure project were being carried out by a locally incorporated joint venture 
or project company. In that case, the offering of insurance products by a Chinese insurer would amount 
to the cross-border supply of insurance products, and would thus face the entry requirements discussed 
above. 
Second, Chinese insurers may acquire reinsurance coverage in ASEAN, notably in Singapore. In this 
situation, they would be seeking reinsurance protection as customers, which is not subject to local 
licensing requirements or market access thresholds. However, once again, whether such reinsurance 
would satisfy CIRC regulations remains an open question. 
Third, the situation would differ if a Chinese insurer wanted to offer reinsurance to direct insurers 
covering losses stemming from projects in Southeast Asia. If a firm from an ASEAN country wanted to 
seek reinsurance coverage from Chinese reinsurers based in China, it would amount to overseas 
consumption by a local firm. Although such consumption is not a problem in most countries, there are 
restrictions in some. For example, overseas consumption in Indonesia is unbound, meaning that the 
Indonesian government is free to apply restrictions, except when no insurance company in Indonesia can 
handle the risk, no insurance company in Indonesia wants to provide coverage or the insured is not an 
Indonesian citizen. If, in contrast, a Chinese reinsurer wanted to offer reinsurance coverage from China 
to direct insurers from ASEAN states, doing so would trigger the restrictions on the cross-border supply 
of insurance products noted above. 
Fourth, to have effective insurance coverage for potential losses, a firm must be able to reach a 
settlement for those losses in a timely fashion. In this respect, auxiliary services such as claim settlement 
and loss evaluation or adjustment can play an essential role in aiding Chinese firms working on 
infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. The existence (or non-existence) of relevant services may 
complicate a firm’s ability to seek payment for losses. Cross-border insurance products render the 
situation even more challenging for the insured firm and insurer alike. There is a significant legal risk 
for a Chinese firm that acquires an insurance product from a Chinese insurer in China. Unfortunately, as 
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the ASEAN insurance market is far from integrated at present, it remains to be seen how the market will 
evolve post-AIIF. 
For both banks and insurance firms, another way to bypass local licensing requirements is to acquire a 
local bank or insurer. However, some ASEAN countries have additional restrictions in this regard. For 
example, it is common for ASEAN financial regulators to control the transfer of substantial equity 
stakes in a bank or insurer, as we saw in Section 2.2, and prior regulatory approval is often required 
before a transfer of ownership is effected.73 The rationale for such regulations lies in prudential 
regulation to ensure that banks and insurers are owned and managed by the proper persons to ensure the 
safety of financial institutions and the financial system. However, they also empower regulators to deter 
foreign ownership, and it is not uncommon for countries to impose direct restrictions on such ownership. 
As in the case of the insurance sector, for example, the Philippines limits foreign ownership of local 
banks to no more than 40 per cent of share capital, whilst Thailand requires at least 75 per cent of local 
bank shares to be held by Thai nationals, effectively limiting foreign ownership to a maximum of 25 per 
cent. The purpose of these restrictions is to ensure local ownership of the financial sector, and how far 
they can be justified by national security or other concerns is debatable. 
Several countries also require foreign banks to form local partnerships before entering the market. For 
example, Indonesia allows a foreign bank to establish or acquire a locally incorporated bank in 
cooperation with Indonesian nationals/entities. In Malaysia, the commercial presence of a foreign bank 
is subject to the local incorporation of a joint venture with foreign ownership capped at 30 per cent. In 
Vietnam, a foreign bank may enter the Vietnamese market by opening a representative office, branch or 
joint venture bank with foreign ownership accounting for no more than 50 per cent. All of these 
restrictions constitute a form of protectionism, creating trade barriers for foreign banks wishing to enter 
the market. Accordingly, Chinese banks may be unable to obtain complete control over domestic banks 
in ASEAN countries, which may be undesirable for accounting or other reasons. Further, owing to the 
aforementioned protectionism rife in ASEAN, the chances of a Chinese bank acquiring a large local 
bank are likely very slim. Even the transfer of ownership from one owner to another within an ASEAN 
country may be blocked for political reasons. For instance, in 2012 after a five-year bid process, 
Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s well-known sovereign wealth fund, announced its intention to sell its 
stake in Bank Danamon, the sixth largest bank in Indonesia, to DBS, a bank of which Temasek owns 
about 30 per cent of shares. However, the deal collapsed after Indonesia changed the law to cap single 
ownership in a domestic bank at 40 per cent (from 99 per cent).74 This example is illustrative of the 
political risks and obstacles that Chinese banks are likely to face in attempting to enter Southeast Asia 
through mergers and acquisitions amidst China’s expansion in the South China Sea and growing 
political and economic ambitions. 
 
 
                                                          
73 For example, see Sections 15–18 of the Singapore Banking Act (Cap 19) and Section 28 of the Singapore Insurance Act 
(Cap 142). 
74 Denny Thomas and Saeed Azhar, ‘Temasek’s Danamon suitors may now be Japanese, Chinese’, Reuters, 1 August 2013, 
accessed 8 June 2018 at www.reuters.com/article/us-temasek-danamon-idUSBRE9700KT20130801. 
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2.4 New Challenges from Financial Innovation  
The twenty-first century is presenting new challenges to incumbent financial service providers, most 
notably the fintech phenomenon, which combines computing technology, Big Data and the internet with 
financial services. Whilst the fintech market is still developing, it is worth exploring some of the related 
issues taking place in parallel with ASEAN financial integration. Here, we briefly consider two broad 
developments that may change the financial landscape during execution of the BRI and construction of 
the New Silk Road. 
First, new fintech firms can offer financial services to those who may have difficulty acquiring financing 
or insurance from traditional banks or insurers. For example, peer-to-peer (P2P) lenders may help to 
match SMEs with individuals who have extra cash to lend in exchange for higher interest income than 
that offered by banks. Europe has also seen the launch of P2P insurance (e.g. Friendsurance). These 
innovations may help to bridge the gap left by traditional domestic or foreign financial service providers. 
With computing power, Big Data and the availability of smartphones increasing even in emerging 
markets, it is only a matter of time before the fintech movement affects Southeast Asia in a big way. As 
Chinese firms are active and innovative players in that movement, they stand to benefit. For example, 
China is home to some of the world’s largest P2P payment services (e.g. Alipay) and associated 
financial services (e.g. Alibaba’s online investment account, Yu E Bao). Such services may help less 
developed countries such as Laos or Myanmar, and financial innovation may one day help foreign firms 
to bypass some of the red tape and trade barriers in place in ASEAN. 
However, fintech firms face a number of legal risks, with some flourishing on the borderline of financial 
regulations. For example, P2P lenders can generally work around banking regulations if they offer a 
platform that matches lenders and borrowers but do not accept any deposits themselves. However, if a 
significant case of fraud or large-scale default were to occur, the regulators might be inclined to move 
towards greater regulation of such lending. In addition, managing the regulations of the ten ASEAN 
countries without a more uniform financial regulatory structure, such as that in the EU, is likely to be 
fraught with difficulty, as each member state may interpret the terms ‘bank’ and ‘banking business’ 
differently. This situation creates legal risks for Chinese fintech firms looking to benefit from the BRI 
by providing financial services to Southeast Asian states. 
Second, the cross-border nature of financial technology and the internet will certainly challenge the 
current legal and regulatory framework for cross-border financial services in the future. For example, if 
a Chinese P2P platform attracts users from Southeast Asian countries who then take the initiative to 
acquire financing from Chinese lenders via the platform, does that constitute the cross-border supply of 
lending services? Although the answer is open to debate, the risks are likely to be high for a Chinese 
P2P operator actively seeking users in an ASEAN state even without answering the question of whether 
such operation amounts to lending. Unfortunately, these types of legal questions cannot be resolved by a 
single legal opinion, but they certainly demand the attention of both financial regulators and 
policymakers in the region in the near future. 
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2.5 Potential Impact on China’s Role in International Governance and the Rule of Law  
How are BRI projects and ASEAN financial integration likely to affect China’s standing with respect to 
international governance and the rule of law in the long term? Whilst the answer depends on many 
factors, ranging from the success of BRI implementation to political and economic conditions in China 
and surrounding countries, this chapter argues for a potentially positive impact in the financial 
regulatory sphere at both the micro and macro levels. 
First, at the micro level, the presence of Chinese banks and financial service providers supporting BRI 
projects in foreign territory will require those banks/service providers to behave in a manner acceptable 
to the host country. Such behaviour is often a condition of market access. For banks, there are at least 
international standards to follow, such as the Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy. However, 
financial service providers will have to accommodate relevant local regulations and licensing standards 
if they want to expand their business beyond China’s borders, particularly when conducting business for 
which there are no established global norms. Accordingly, Chinese financial service providers must find 
commonly acceptable standards to conduct business, not only to satisfy Chinese regulations (if any) but 
also those of host countries, much like multinational banks and corporations are currently forced to do. 
Further ASEAN financial integration down the road, if implemented successfully, may also give 
ASEAN countries more clout in imposing regulations on both domestic and foreign financial firms, 
whether they be well-established financial institutions or new fintech firms. This has certainly been the 
case in the EU. Such a scenario could well create a race-to-the-top momentum that drives Chinese firms 
to raise their business practices and standards in a uniform manner, which could in turn improve the rule 
of law in China, premised of course on the ASEAN standards being more stringent than their Chinese 
counterparts. 
Second, at the macro level, Chinese-origin projects and China’s mighty political and economic power 
could create new international governance norms. It is perhaps too early to claim that China will be able 
to call the shots and lay down the international order as the United States did after World War II. Also, 
with regard to trade issues, negotiations and trade agreements between China and ASEAN will 
determine the mutual flow of financial services and related products. However, with respect to purely 
financial regulatory issues, and in the context of China’s rise as a superpower and its willingness to force 
the Chinese will through the BRI, it is possible that the country may attempt to impose a new 
international financial regulatory order based on its own needs. As Gao and Chen argue, economic and 
market power are often driving forces behind the migration of norms and rules in the financial 
regulatory sphere.75 Given China’s immense economic and political power, it is not wholly impossible 
that the country will become the source of a new financial regulatory order in the future, superseding the 
role of the United States, United Kingdom and Europe. 
International financial norms have traditionally been created by the Western powers and implemented 
via the so-called ‘soft law’ approach through a network of international organisations (i.e. such 
‘transnational regulatory networks’76 as the Bank of International Settlement and Financial Stability 
                                                          
75 See Simon Gao and Christopher Chen, ‘Transnationalism and financial regulation change: a case of derivative markets’ 
(2017) 18(1) European Business Organization Law Review 193–223. 
76 Stavros Gadinis, ‘Three pathways to global standards: private, regulator, and ministry networks’ (2015) 109(1) American 
Journal of International Law 1–57 at 1. 
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Board) whose membership comprises the national regulators of major markets.77 China and several 
ASEAN countries are also part of this international system.78 From this perspective, there seems no need 
for China to impose its will and create a separate set of rules. Considering the current state of the 
ASEAN financial market, Southeast Asia is also far from being in any position to serve as a rule-maker. 
However, the question of whether uniform rules are an absolute good (or bad) remains subject to debate. 
Having uniform rules that apply everywhere provides a simple benchmark for market participants and 
regulators worldwide to make comparisons amongst banks and financial institutions, and may also help 
to connect different markets for various purposes (e.g. clearing and trading) and reduce the costs of 
market participants. However, such a one-size-fits-all approach set by the developed world may hinder 
competition, particularly for developing markets such as China and many ASEAN countries. With the 
rise of the fintech movement and growing power of Chinese e-commerce firms, there may be room for 
the development of separate regulatory standards or rules that deal with issues unaddressed by existing 
soft law standards. China’s BRI may provide a platform for the development of bilateral or multilateral 
regulatory standards that facilitate the cross-border provision of financial services by Chinese firms to 
other countries (or entry to China for non-Chinese firms). It could well be in ASEAN’s interests to have 
regulatory standards in common with China or other neighbouring countries, not only to benefit from 
China’s advanced e-commerce services but also to help local firms in Southeast Asia to take advantage 
of China’s huge market and to ride the BRI development wave. 
 
3 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter considers two geopolitical movements that are occurring simultaneously. 
China is seeking to build a New Silk Road under the auspices of the BRI, constructing both a land-based 
Silk Road through Central Asia and a maritime Silk Road traversing Southeast Asia and the Indian 
Ocean. At the same time, the countries of Southeast Asia have committed themselves to closer economic 
and financial integration in the coming decades. Although ASEAN does not function like the EU, it is 
expected to increase integration, albeit slowly, in the banking and insurance sectors following the 
announcement of ABIF and several bilateral agreements amongst ASEAN states, as well as the pending 
AIIF. 
It is argued herein that Chinese banks and insurers may wish to offer essential financial services to 
advance the BRI concept. However, at present they will still face a great deal of red tape in seeking to 
provide lending or insurance services within the ASEAN region. As foreign firms, Chinese banks or 
insurers must generally comply with local licensing requirements to supply cross-border lending or 
insurance to or have a commercial presence in an ASEAN country. Several ASEAN member states also 
impose ceilings on the foreign ownership of domestic banks and insurers. 
Even ABIF’s passage has not necessarily made market entry easier for Chinese banks. Although there is 
a lack of transparency regarding the content of both that framework and bilateral agreements, QAB 
status is expected to apply primarily to banks incorporated in and owned by an ASEAN state. In other 
                                                          
77 See, generally, Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
78 For example, China, Singapore and Indonesia are all members of the Financial Stability Board, although many other 
ASEAN countries, unlike the EU, do not have direct membership of this or other international organisations. 
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words, a certain degree of local protectionism is still permitted under the terms of ABIF. Therefore, the 
hands of Chinese banks and insurers remained tied in terms of cross-border lending and insurance 
service provision. However, the rise of the fintech movement and continued advancement of China’s 
tech-savvy internet giants are likely to raise new issues for ASEAN politicians and regulators, 
particularly with respect to cross-border services. As ASEAN slowly moves towards further integration, 
the role of fintech firms is worth monitoring. In the long run, the successful implementation of the BRI 
may afford China an opportunity to set international regulatory rules in cooperation with its partners in 
surrounding countries, including the ASEAN nations, and the globalisation of Chinese financial firms 
may help to raise the standard of business practices in China, thereby indirectly enhancing the rule of 
law. 
 
